Presumed guilty until proven credible: epistemic injustice toward Venezuelan immigrants in Colombia

Presumed guilty until proven credible: epistemic injustice toward Venezuelan immigrants in Colombia

Blog Article

With few exceptions, philosophers working on immigration have not taken up the serra avatar price topic of epistemic injustice, primarily, I imagine, because immigration justice is often too narrowly conceived of as encompassing moral and political concerns rather than epistemic ones.But the more I think about the injustices immigrants endure on a daily basis, the more I take this to be a mistake; epistemic injustices must be seen as a central aspect of immigration injustice too.In what follows, I will demonstrate how here this is the case.More specifically, after providing an overview of the nature of epistemic injustice, I will highlight some examples of it in the lives of displaced Venezuelan immigrants in Colombia.

In doing so, I hope to show why discussions about immigration injustice must include identifying and confronting epistemic wrongs.